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Prototype of running clinical trials in an
untrustworthy environment using blockchain
Daniel R. Wong1,2, Sanchita Bhattacharya1,2 & Atul J. Butte 1,2,3
Monitoring and ensuring the integrity of data within the clinical trial process is currently not
always feasible with the current research system. We propose a blockchain-based system to
make data collected in the clinical trial process immutable, traceable, and potentially more
trustworthy. We use raw data from a real completed clinical trial, simulate the trial onto a
proof of concept web portal service, and test its resilience to data tampering. We also assess
its prospects to provide a traceable and useful audit trail of trial data for regulators, and a
flexible service for all members within the clinical trials network. We also improve the way
adverse events are currently reported. In conclusion, we advocate that this service could offer
an improvement in clinical trial data management, and could bolster trust in the clinical
research process and the ease at which regulators can oversee trials.
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C linical trial networks often involve many parties and sites,and a large flow of information and confidential data.With the involvement of more parties, more exchanges,
and trials being conducted far from sponsoring institutions comes
the opportunity for human-induced error, whether it is unin-
tentional or malicious. In a survey of authors of clinical drug
trials, 17% of them reported that they were personally aware of
intentional fabrication in research1. Although it is obviously not
possible to calculate the actual rate or impact of fraud, there is
evidence that some misconduct and alteration of data is happen-
ing in scientific and medical research2, potentially including
clinical trials. In addition, current clinical trials are executed with
many manual processes that could be prone to error. Enforcing
Good Clinical Practice guidelines set forth by the International
Council for Harmonization of Requirements for Pharmaceuticals
for Human Use (ICH) has been a challenge for regulators of
trials, and process improvement is an active area of research3. For
regulators of trials such as the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), auditing of data are challenging, and real-time oversight
of a trial is lacking as there is no easy and secure way of accessing
or viewing the complex network of data transactions as they
occur. There can be a lack of transparency and traceability of
data, lack of real-time access to results as they are made, and
potentially a risk of data tampering3. The ability to easily trace
data back to the original source can be limited4, and the FDA has
identified this lack of traceability as one of their top data issues to
address5.
Blockchain is a new software development methodology
involving a unique data structure that has garnered increased
attention due to the seminal paper that outlined Bitcoin (bitcoin.
org)6. The technology provides a data structure that ensure a
secure and unfalsifiable transaction history. This is accomplished
primarily through the use of cryptographic hashing, which has
properties and use cases in many domains ranging from internet
security to banking. A hash function is a function that maps data
of variable length data to a fixed-length digest. Any change to the
input data result in an unpredictable change in the hash. In this
implementation, each new block added to the chain includes a
hash of the previous block. If the previous block is later changed,
the subsequent hash would no longer be valid. In addition,
blockchains are designed to be append only, and are thus
immutable by design, providing a guarantee of safeguarded data.
This yields a verifiable and tamper proof history of all transac-
tions since its beginning6.
We propose a solution to the challenges in the current clinical
trials system by using blockchain technology, coupled with
changes in methodology for the management of clinical trials.
Due to the innate need of clinical trials to have a centralized
authority, such as through the regulator, a completely decen-
tralized blockchain infrastructure as used in Bitcoin might not be
appropriate. Instead, we borrow ideas and repurpose the meth-
odology to work with clinical trial management, and demonstrate
the feasibility with a new prototype web portal. Blockchain has
already been proposed for use in various healthcare settings7,
with potential applications in medical record management, claims
processing, health supply chain management, and integration of
geospatial data in various data modalities8. Work has already
begun in seeing how clinical trial management can be improved
with blockchain technologies9,10. Moreover, certain aspects rele-
vant to the clinical trial process, such as patient recruiting and
IRB (Institutional Review Board) enforcement of human subject
regulations via smart contracts, have been described at a high
level in the literature11. We improve upon previous work by
implementing a web-based portal accessible to all parties with a
real clinical trial dataset, facilitating and verifying patient and
clinical investigator interaction, integrating version control into
the blockchain, expediting adverse event reporting, and testing
malicious attacks to data integrity with real world clinical data.
Results
Network protocol. We modeled a prototype phase II clinical trial.
Upon approval of the study protocol and initiation of phase II, we
propose a future regulator could instantiate a private blockchain
and registers all participating parties in the portal providing
authenticated and controlled web-based and API (application
programming interface) access to the blockchain. All parties
would be required to use the portal service for any and all
exchange of information related to the trial, and only the infor-
mation present on the blockchain would be used for review when
considering approval of the treatment. The network and repre-
sentative transactions are illustrated in Fig. 1.
For new patient recruitment and consent acquisition by the
clinical site, we propose that an Interactive Voice Response
System (IVRS) generates unique verification codes for each
subject to give to the trial investigator at the clinical site, and
posts encrypted decoding keys for later unblinding. The decoding
keys describe the various treatment types that a patient can
receive, and will be saved in a password protected environment by
the IVRS service provider. The trial sponsor then sends a blinded
treatment distribution scheme to the trial investigator at the
clinical site. The unique verification codes for each subject are
appended to that subject’s CRF at the clinical site upon the office
visit. All CRFs would be completed digitally and considered valid
if the proper verification code is present. Once completed, the
CRF will be directed to the Clinical Research Organization (CRO)
involved in the trial, and this transaction will be stamped onto the
growing blockchain.
When adverse events are reported, we envision the Data Safety
Management Board (DSMB) or regulatory agency would be able
to continuously see these events through each chain-posted CRF,
and then potentially propagate these onto that trial’s page for
public view, if appropriate. Once the CRO receives raw CRF data,
data cleaning, and statistical analysis can begin and be done
transparently. Upon completion, cleaned data and analysis scripts
are sent to the trial sponsor through the portal and these
transactions are subsequently recorded onto the blockchain. Any
outside data collection sources that are enrolled in the clinical
trial would also have to send data to the sponsor through the
portal, all marked on the growing ledger.
When the trial sponsor wishes to apply for approval of the
drug, the sponsor would send all of their finalized data and in
house statistical analysis results to the regulator through the
portal and these, like all other elements, would be subsequently
added to the chain. When reviewing for approval, the regulator
will only consider data that are present on this secure blockchain,
and has full read access to everything that has occurred since the
blockchain’s instantiation. All data that were ever transmitted in
the network would be easily accessible, and its integrity and
guarantee of when the transaction occurred will be assured.
Data transaction details. Whenever a transaction occurs, the
sender, receiver, timestamp, file attachment, and hash of the
previous block, are all recorded onto a new block. These elements
are then concatenated together, and hashed using the SHA256
algorithm12, with the result instantiated as the hash string of the
current block. The blockchain is constructed by creating a linked
list of such blocks (Fig. 2). The previous block’s hash is kept for
ordering and to make each block dependent on all blocks that
preceded it in the chain, which is a useful property for quickly
validating a chain6. Data storage of the blockchain will be
accomplished by duplicating and distributing the chain to
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physically separate machines and data warehouses to be managed
by the regulator (see Supplementary Methods).
Encryption through a password based key derivation function
is offered, and can ensure that sensitive information is protected if
the user chooses to do so, which is especially relevant to
maintaining integrity of health and medical information, and
eliminating information exposure to unwanted parties. Data are
thus stored as an unintelligible series of bytes at the storage level,
ensuring that any sensitive information in the network is
obfuscated and will not be compromised in the incident of a
data breach.
File storage of any type onto the blockchain is supported, and
the user is able to encrypt, send, and extract files easily. For
regulators, the full transaction history since the block’s genesis is
readily available with precise timestamps (Fig. 3a), and the
auditing process can be done swiftly and with the confidence that
all data are original or version controlled. Content since the
earliest phases of the trial are sorted, fully transparent, and easily
compressible, and downloadable.
Version controls. If a user needs to edit content that is already
present on the blockchain, such as the case when an honest
mistake is made and needs to be corrected, the user could make
an update known by submitting a new transaction with the
corrected data without overwriting the old data. By nature,
blockchains are append only, so editing the data directly on the
blockchain is not possible. We propose combining blockchain’s
append only criteria with version controlling similar to the
functionality of GitHub to accommodate this issue. When a new
file is uploaded in a transaction, its contents are hashed and
compared to any existing files on the blockchain. If there is a
conflict, then the system initiates a schema in which subsequent
and differing versions of a file are given incrementing version
numbers automatically. Hence, a user can be assured that any
downstream modifications to that user’s file by anyone else in the
network will be documented and cannot be done discretely. No
trust in any other parties in the network is needed for data purity,
as any tampering will be version controlled and any editors of the
file will be easily identified (Fig. 3b).
Simulation of a previously completed clinical trial. To test how
blockchain software technologies could be used to manage the
governance and data management aspects of a clinical trial,
we simulated how a previously completed clinical trial testing the
efficacy and safety of omalizumab13 could have been executed
using blockchain. We downloaded the completed clinical trials
data, including all necessary components, such as raw data, case
report form (CRF) components, and protocols from the
open clinical trials data repository ImmPort14 (see Data Avail-
ability). The trial simulation sequence of events and corre-
sponding files are shown in Fig. 2. Of the 159 actual patients in
the trial with CRF data, we mimicked one subject from each of
the four treatment arms for the sake of clarity. Only a few selected
categories from the large wealth of CRF information were mir-
rored for the same reason (see Methods). The statistical scripts in
this simulation are not the real Python analyses because of our
lack of access.
Here, we show a simulation of how different types of clinical
trial events were implemented using our blockchain-based data
portal. The first event occurs during encounters between a clinical
investigator and the patients after being enrolled for a clinical
trial. The second event we simulated is the mutation of CRF data
by the trial sponsor. The third event is a storage level corruption
Patients
Verification
codes
Placebo
distribution key
Supplemental
data
Cleaned CRF data and
statistical analyses
Treatment
distribution
Verification
codes
CRFs
KEY KEY
Trial investigator
+
–
Interactive voice
response system
Outside data
collection agencies
Trial sponsor
Adverse
eventsSummary + alldata
Clinical research
organization
Data safety monitoring
boardRegulatory agency
Fig. 1 The idealized clinical trial network in the context of a blockchain-based record system. The various transactions (along each arrow) and key
participants (boxed) within a clinical trial are shown
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on the machine housing the data. Finally, we demonstrate an
improved and expedited version of adverse event reporting.
Patient and clinical investigator encounters. We composed
truncated and digitized CRFs for the four patients we mimicked
on the portal using the publicly available CRF component data.
For instance, Subject 73,491 from the study came to the clinical
site on the first day of the trial period (day 0). The investigator
collected immunological data, such as a white blood cell con-
centration of 5.9 × 103 cells per μL, eosinophil percentage of 4.6%,
and platelet count of 223 × 103 cells per μL (Supplementary
Note 1). In our proposed schema, if the CRF were paper based,
then it would be scanned in; if electronically captured, it would
be directly added to the growing blockchain via the portal, as is
the case in our simulation. Verification codes are appended to
each CRF.
User mediated corruption. We then simulated two types of
hostile conditions for the trial. The first was to simulate an effort
to manipulate data that were uploaded from other trial staff.
While logged in as the trial sponsor, we attempted to modify the
adverse events reported in selected CRFs that recorded subjects
73,491 and 73,511 receiving the treatment drug omalizumab so as
to deceptively bolster treatment approval in a potentially
untrustworthy network. Subject 73,491 showed many adverse
reactions during the treatment period, such as muscle strain,
injection site swelling, sinus headaches, and nasal congestion
among other events (Supplementary Note 1), while Subject
73,511 exhibited events such as chest tightness, injection site
reactions, sinus congestion, decreased blood pressure, and a lower
respiratory tract infection among other ill effects (Supplementary
Note 2). As the trial sponsor, these CRFs were mutated such that
no adverse events were listed (Supplementary Note 3, 4). The new
tampered replacement files are appended with a version number
automatically (Fig. 3b), and the corrupting party, time of mod-
ification, and changes are all easily visible. The system is capable
of handling multiple versions of files in case the original one is
part of a later transaction, or in case further revisions or illegi-
timate mutations are made. These are designated with incre-
menting version numbers for each new unique version. Original
documents, however, are designated with no version number.
With an append only transaction scheme and version
controlling, we have a means of keeping a full record of
everything that happens to a file, and can easily refer to the author
and old and new versions of data, similar to the concept and
flexibility of GitHub. This is integral to the auditing process as
regulators can track precisely what was changed, by whom, and
when with the immutable timestamp. Hence, we simultaneously
accommodate the user’s need for making changes clear, the
regulator’s desire for monitoring data easily, and also abide by
blockchain’s append only schema, which allows for the main-
tenance and persistence of older data.
Storage corruption. The second hostile condition we simulated
was that of an intentional fault or data corruption at the storage
level. In this simulation, we purposefully corrupted the treatment
distribution outlining which medication plan was given to which
patients (Supplementary Table 1, 2) to check if the infrastructure
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of the trial, and what information constitutes a block
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Fig. 3 Portal functionality. a The public ledger shows the full transaction history since the start of the trial. Blocks are timestamped, indexed, and attached
with the file of the transaction and identities of the participating parties. The regulator can easily download individual files, or all elements in bulk, and
inspect when and between whom files are shared. b New versions of files are given a version number, which increments with each new version of that file.
In the screenshot above, the original CRF was modified by the sponsor and automatically appended with a (v2) by the system (boxed in red). The
responsible party and time of modification are readily apparent. c Internal validation and automated hash checks take place to verify the integrity of the
data without the need to manually read through the data’s contents. Hash checks are performed chronologically starting with the genesis block, and verify
that the hash of the contents of the block match what is to be expected (see Supplementary Methods). Validation fails when the treatmentDistribution.csv
is modified at the storage level. The precise origin and location of the fault can be readily discerned. d Adverse events are auto populated from investigator
uploaded CRFs to the pages of the regulator and DSMB, circumventing the normal, slower, and more error prone pathway that is normally taken for
adverse event reporting. Such instances are available for inspection at the soonest possible time
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would detect and guard against such changes. In the blockchain
ledger section of the portal, there is a validation check that suc-
cessfully shows exactly where the fault and corrupted file lies
(Fig. 3c). Due to the sensitivity of a hash function’s output in
relation to its input, changing the data in even the smallest way in
a block, such as modifying a single character in the block’s
attached file, will result in a completely different hash string. This
string will be fed into the input of the next block’s hash function,
and the resulting string will be completely different from what it
was prior to the data modification. Hence, data integrity can be
checked by simply comparing the hash strings of a proposed
blockchain under audit with a set of verified and correct hashes.
Since each transaction is given its own block, precise determi-
nation of location and file that were corrupted are possible by
simply finding the first block with an incorrect hash. Hence,
storage of the desired and correct hashes is necessary, and we
advocate for centralized and secured storage by the trusted reg-
ulator who will be performing the audit (see Supplementary
Methods). Since only hash strings are required for the purpose of
verifying integrity, the regulator need not allocate much hard disk
space for the audit process. Verifying integrity can be done
quickly as the regulator need only check for string equivalence,
which is a quick and trivial process.
Zero-knowledge proof of purity. In this proof of concept
model, we illustrate the ease at which a data repository can be
checked and verified for tampering without manually reviewing
each file. SHA256 hashing is a quick and highly optimized
process12, and comparing two hash string for equality is trivial.
Hence, verifying originality can be done quickly, and without
actually opening and inspecting data, which is useful if con-
fidential data are being audited. This serves as a zero-knowledge
proof15 of data integrity because the auditor need not know the
exact configurations and detailed information within a file, and
yet still verify its originality. This is particularly useful for the
data being handled in clinical processes. This type of metho-
dology and proof provides another layer of security and respect
for confidential data, all while quickly and automatically ver-
ifying purity of data. Furthermore, by giving the user the option
of storing encrypted data on the servers, we ensure that sensi-
tive information cannot be compromised even in the event of a
data breach.
Expedited adverse event reporting. As part of the simulation in
the portal, we also scrutinized adverse event reporting and how to
improve it. In abidance with the goal of making the management
of a clinical trial easier and more effective than the current
standard, adverse events from the clinical investigator uploaded
CRFs are automatically parsed and populated to the pages of the
regulator and DSMB (Fig. 3d). This not only serves as a fast
means of assessing safety as the trial continues, but also cir-
cumvents the slower and potentially error prone route that
adverse event reporting would normally take before reaching the
regulator. In the current way clinical trials are run, the CRFs
would normally be sent to the CRO, who then parses out the
adverse reactions and reports these events to the sponsor, who
sends these reports to the DSMB. This process takes time, and is
subject to modification or loss by human error or malice. In
the proposed scheme and proof of concept service, this vulnerable
process is circumvented, and the regulator or DSMB can
be immediately notified of each subject’s adverse reactions at the
soonest possible time, which can be crucial for maintaining public
safety. Since the adverse events are extracted directly from the
CRFs on the immutable blockchain, the regulator and DSMB can
be assured that the events are legitimate.
Discussion
Blockchain architecture has been prescribed to cure many data
interoperability challenges today, including tasks such as over-
turning the current financial system6 and remodeling the infra-
structure of the internet16. Many of these proposed solutions are
either not realistic, or have not yet demonstrated efficacy. Here,
we showed that a blockchain-based file and data structure could
be used to reliably safeguard data in a clinical trials network, and
provide an immutable and fully traceable audit trail. Scalability is
of utmost importance when considering the utility of such an
architecture, especially if it were to move to full-scale production
from proof of concept. The system scales linearly in regards to
memory allocation. Similarly, performance is also linear in
dataset size, so the architecture is able to scale well (for formal
discussion, see Supplementary Discussion).
By using the actual clinical trials data from a previously
completed major clinical study, Efficacy and Safety Evaluation of
Allergen Immunotherapy Co-Administered with Omalizumab,
we showed that data entry, storage, and adverse event reporting
can be performed in a more robust and secure manner, which
could withstand attacks from both other people in the network
and infrastructure damage at the storage level.
We do see some limitations in this work. Forcing all partici-
pating parties to use a service like this will still remain a challenge.
This could be overcome by restricting regulatory approval of a
proposed treatment upon the condition that the trial sponsor uses
the service for information exchange, and that CROs and trial
investigators are used supporting this methodology. By law, many
trials that study drugs, biologics, or devices are required to reg-
ister with the clinicaltrials.gov portal17, so requiring a registration
with a service like this could be feasible.
To encourage use of the service and ensure data integrity, only
data on the blockchain would be considered when reviewing
potential approval of a drug. Hence, any offline personal
transactions of data such as through email would be dis-
couraged. Although blockchain technology provides a means of
recording data into structures that are immutable, traceable, and
verifiable, it cannot prevent data from being falsified at the point
of origin. Clinicians or clinical researchers can be careless or
fraudulent and record misleading data into the CRFs, and sta-
tisticians within pharmaceutical companies can overinflate p-
values because of vested interests in success. These mistakes
would be carried forward in the blockchain. The ideal would be
to encourage the most raw forms of data or input to be captured
as early as possible into the blockchain. Regardless, with unfal-
sifiable data collected from clinical investigators and cleaned by
CROs before being sent to the sponsors, regulators would have
the raw data to validate the statistical results due to the design of
blockchain. Independent statistical analyses can be run to verify
the results. The sponsoring statisticians and CROs could also be
required to post their Python and R analysis scripts and freeze
these on the ledger for verification and reproducibility, though
this is not necessary or critical to the blockchain architecture and
merely an example of how the chain can be potentially utilized
after its creation. More generally, by being able to see each edge
in the network and the corresponding transaction and values,
regulators are able to confidently cross check the results of any
given subsequent transaction.
By providing each patient with a verification code to give to
their physician and validate the CRF upon visit, patient interac-
tion is ensured. Note that this is independent to the functionality
of the blockchain infrastructure and design, and merely an
additional modification we propose to the clinical trials process
with feasibility and ease yet to be tested. Unfortunately, if a
patient and fraudulent clinician are in full adverse cooperation,
there is no way of assuring that real data are generated for that
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office visit. In theory, physicians could still fraudulently purchase
these verification codes from patients to save time and avoid
running the test trial, but adding a verification code provides a
deterrent from blatantly fabricating CRFs. Fabricating data will
require the involvement and cooperation of the patient. This will
be less enticing and riskier for the clinician to generate fake CRFs,
as the clinician is no longer the only party with knowledge of the
forgery. Discovery of malpractice is now more likely and can
make administering the office visit treatment more attractive than
fabrication. Additionally, moving clinicians away from paper-
based recordings and forms may also be difficult, but not
impossible as the move towards electronic health records (EHRs)
rises and as the public concern for non-standardized and fallible
physical documentation increases. In contrast to physical doc-
umentation, which can be convincingly modified, digital docu-
ments through our blockchain service cannot be changed without
being noticed and invalidated. Accommodating the current
standard of paper documentation is still possible with the service,
since these can be easily scanned and converted to a digitized data
type to be added to the immutable ledger.
We chose to give data storage control to the regulator, as
opposed to distributing data storage to nodes across participants
in the network like in Bitcoin applications. We preferred this
design because the trial regulator is the only party that can and
must be trusted, since this party is the one having final approval
over success or rejection of the treatment. It is a central authority
that cannot be eliminated. We feel implementing distributed
storage to everyone in the network (such as that used for Bitcoin)
does not fit this regulatory context well, and is also impractical as
all parties would also have to locally store data pertinent to the
clinical trial on their machines. Requiring usage of a web appli-
cation is a much more feasible first step, and the regulator can
have more refined control over the data and abstract management
away from the users.
This service could be an improvement to the current clinical
system, and could be integrated into existing workflows with the
use of a web-based platform, such as the one prototyped here. A
service like this could be especially useful in the context of
international clinical trials in which oversight is more difficult to
administer1. Moreover, there is an added benefit to the regulator
as overwatch and monitoring in real-time since the beginning of a
trial could be more feasible, and the regulator need not wait until
a final summary package is delivered by the sponsor at the end of
the trial. However, current regulatory bodies might not be ready
to deal with real-time data access.
This framework can also serve to advance the initiative towards
open and publicly accessible big data, as the regulator can
selectively decide which data elements to release to the public on
the portal for each clinical trial. For future directions, the portal
can be easily expanded in functionality to include services similar
to clinicaltrials.gov, and also open access to raw data for research
scientists like the concept behind the ImmPort repository14. An
interesting future direction and direct application would be to use
this methodology to broadcast information that the trial sponsor
and regulator deem fit to show to the general public directly
through the clinicaltrials.gov portal. This could be an exciting
avenue that both takes advantage of the efficiencies in speed and
security that this proof of concept has to offer, along with
maintaining regulator discretion and control over data. Of course,
much work would be needed before this hypothetical direction
can be realized. The idea of open access to clinical trials data are a
debated topic18,19, but services like ImmPort have shown that
there is a desire among trial sponsors and the scientific com-
munity, notably the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Disease (NIAID) and National Institutes of Health (NIH), to
make this data accessible and open14. In addition, the Interna-
tional Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) has
expressed their commitment to promoting clinical research data
to be openly available18.
We propose leaving the question of opening access to trials
data to a case-by-case decision of the regulator and sponsor, if
they wish to disseminate data on the chain, keeping in mind
that the feasibility of maintaining patient privacy and data
usability is a question that needs a case-by-case perspective.
Our proposal and proof of concept can be synthesized in a
methodology that combines ideas of open access data sharing,
and the resulting security and trust benefits that arise from
blockchain technology. It is important to note however that our
blockchain service does not solve or speak to the complex issues
of public data sharing, and we are simply advocating this as a
potential post-trial use of the service if the regulator deems it
responsible and safe. All of the additional functionality that we
propose can be integrated into this system, and we will have a
unified platform for all things clinical trial catering to the
researcher, regulator, and potentially public client. If a service
like the one that we propose in this paper can be adopted, the
benefits of immutability, traceability, and more trust in the
clinical research process can ensue. Regulators can confidently
track the complex flow of data throughout a trial, and be kept
up to date on safety proceedings and progress.
Methods
Portal implementation and simulated trial data. We built a proof of concept web
portal to access a trial-specific blockchain. The portal was built using a Python and
Django software development framework, with additional Python encryption
libraries, including hashlib and simplecrypt. The portal is hosted on the cloud
platform Heroku. A proof of concept prototype of the portal can be found at:
http://trialchain.ucsf.edu/. This implementation of the service we are proposing is
meant as a proof of concept and is not designed for production usage.
Code availability. All source code can be found at https://github.com/
wongdaniel8/ClinicalTrials. The code is publicly accessible for view to encourage
reproducibility. The software requirements can be found in the GitHub repository,
within the requirements.txt file.
CRF extraction. In order to test the utility of this service with real world data, we
used open access data from a real completed clinical trial: Efficacy and Safety
Evaluation of Allergen Immunotherapy Co-Administered with Omalizumab
(NCT00078195)13. The trial had a total of 159 patients and four treatment arms
(see Supplemental Table 2). For the sake of brevity and clarity, we extracted
information from four patients in total, one per treatment type. Only a subset of
the large wealth of CRF data were mirrored for the simulation. Broad information
like race, gender, and age were included. Since the clinical trial was studying
allergen immunotherapy, we also extracted relevant assay measurements such as
free IgG-a and free IgE-a concentrations in the blood. Additional relevant
immunological data, such as concentrations of white blood cells were extracted,
and included measurements for monocytes, neutrophils, eosinophils, basophils,
and lymphocytes. Concentrations of red blood cells, corpuscular hemoglobin, and
platelets were also extracted and recorded into the CRFs. Known adverse events
reported during the trial period were also parsed and included in the digitized
CRFs. We inserted a necessary verification code on each CRF, with the motivation
of encouraging patient and clinician interaction. To meet the requirement of a
verification code being present to legitimize the CRF, we simulated the patient
providing the verification code (received from the IVRS) to the clinical investigator
staff to place on the CRF. Upon audit, the regulator would check that each CRF has
the necessary verification code in a process that can be readily machine automated.
Data availability
We downloaded the completed clinical trials data from the clinical trials data repository
ImmPort (SDY1, www.immport.org)14. The link to the SDY1 data can be found here:
https://www.immport.org/shared/study/SDY1. Elements were downloaded on 2 March
2018.
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